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In October 2011, one of us—Susan—sat in the offices of a Central 
American community organization in Los Angeles, observing a routine family visa 
preparation appointment between a  member of the legal staff and Amalia Gomez 
Mendoza (pseudonym), a Salvadoran woman who appeared to be in her mid-
fifties. Amalia, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was petitioning for her son, Marco 
(pseudonym), who lived in El Salvador. As she produced myriad documents—
birth, death, divorce, and naturalization certificates, tax statements, employment 
records—for him to review, the staff member suddenly caught a discrepancy. 
According to the birth certificate, although Marco was born in the 1970s, his birth 
was not registered until 1993. The staff member indicated that from Immigration 
officials’ point of view, such a delay could suggest fraud, so officials might request 
additional proof of Amalia’s relationship with her son. Amalia reacted with some 
alarm, “Then what should we do?” “There isn’t anything we can do,” he 
responded, “We will have to see if that is how that is they react.”1 Amalia 
explained that she had registered her son’s birth promptly, but that the municipal 
government building had burned down during the 1980–1992 Salvadoran Civil 
War, destroying the original record. Everyone, she said, had had to replace their 
                                                          
* Susan Coutin thanks Jennifer Chacón for deepening Susan’s understanding of immigration law, and 
the nonprofit agency mentioned in the paper for its assistance with the project.  
** Justin Richland thanks the various representatives and members of the Native Nation who allowed 
him to observe their efforts in seeking federal recognition from the U.S. government, and the archives 
this effort has produced.  
*** Véronique Fortin also thanks both the nonprofit agency and the Native Nation for having so 
generously welcomed her. The authors’ research was made possible by National Science Foundation 
Grant # SES-1061063 and a grant from the University of Chicago Department of Anthropology 
Lichtstern fund.  
1. Susan Coutin, Field Notes (Oct. 2011) (on file with author). 
           
98 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:97 
birth certificates after the war. Though the staff member had said that nothing 
could be done to counter the implication of fraud, he in fact located, translated, 
and submitted the text of a Salvadoran law authorizing the re-registry of births in 
1992 and 1993, following the war.2 Through the remainder of the appointment, 
Amalia nonetheless continued to worry that the re-registry of her child’s birth, due 
to circumstances beyond her control, could be construed as fraudulent, thus 
jeopardizing the petition that she was preparing.  
The following week, the three authors of this paper met with leaders of a 
Native American Tribal Nation at their headquarters in Southern California, just 
steps from a famous Spanish mission dating back to the 1600s. While the tribal 
genealogist and a few tribal elders pored over genealogical records on a table 
behind us, the tribal Chairman and archivist showed us to an old boiler room and 
broom closet that had been repurposed as a storage space, and which was now 
stacked to the rafters with cardboard boxes and filing cabinets. The boxes and 
cabinets, the Chairman explained, contained “the [Tribal] National Archive,” 
those primary and secondary documents from over three hundred years of human 
history in the region, all of which had been compiled as part of the Tribe’s now 
thirty-year effort to gain recognition from the federal government of their status 
as a Native Nation. 
Turning and opening the first file cabinet drawer within reach to his left, the 
Chairman revealed row upon row of brown hanging file folders, each with a 
number and a corresponding name. Inside were photocopies of old public 
records, newspaper clippings, personal correspondence, even photocopies of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century baptismal records from the Mission, all of 
which helped to trace each member’s descent from someone known to be an 
Indian living as a member of a historical Indian entity at some point prior to 1900. 
Such proof, he explained, is what tribes are required to provide under the relevant 
federal regulations.3 But while it is true that these regulations require that 
petitioners prove that they have existed as a distinct community with political 
authority over members since historical times into the present, and that petitioners 
have been consistently identified as an “Indian entity” since before 1900, none of 
these requirements seems to matter if the Tribal Nation cannot first establish that 
their “membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical Indian 
tribe,” as is stated in 25 C.F.R. section 83.7(e).4 As he would later contend, “No 
tribe has ever been denied federal recognition who has been found to meet criteria 
                                                          
2. Diario Oficial (D.O.) Decree 205, D.O., Mar. 24, 1992, at 3–4 (El Sal.). This law’s 
application was extended for six months in 1993 as part of a set of measures that were designed to 
facilitate the reinsertion of ex-FMLN combatants. These measures were part of a broader set of 
policies adopted to implement the peace accords. See Acuerdo Complementario del 22 de Diciembre 
de 1992, EL DIARIO DE HOY, http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/especiales/acuerdosdepaz2002/ 
nota8.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (describing measures implementing the Salvadoran peace 
accords). 
3. Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 25 
C.F.R. pt. 83 (2013). 
4. Id. § 83.7. 
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(e).”5 And yet, the Chairman also admitted, there have been plenty of times when 
the federal government seemed to change the rules just when tribal members had 
thought they had done everything they could to meet them. For example, one 
document that appeared in many of the files is a “Certificate of Degree of Indian 
Blood,” a document issued by the Department of Interior in the 1920s 
establishing the named party as having satisfied the necessary criteria for proving 
their Indian ancestry so that he or she could receive proceeds from various Indian 
Claims Commission settlements going on at the time.6 Such certificates, explained 
the Chairman, are not deemed valid and sufficient proof that the holder or his or 
her children or grandchildren are of Indian descent pursuant to 25 C.F.R. section 
83.7(e). Apparently something more, or different, is needed. “It’s a pedigree, 
really,” the Chairman explained, with exasperation, “Like a dog. Can you think of 
any other race that has had to do this?”7  
In these two examples, immigrant and indigenous people encounter federal 
authorities as entities that can discredit their records, treating evidence as suspect 
and claims as potentially fraudulent. As a U.S. citizen, Amalia has the right to 
petition for her son, but U.S. officials can decide whether or not to recognize her 
son’s relationship to her. Likewise, the Tribal Nation has the right to seek federal 
recognition, but the U.S. government, not the Tribe, sets—and changes—the 
standards that they must meet for that recognition. Both immigrant and 
indigenous groups occupy a space of exception vis-à-vis U.S. law: as “resident 
aliens” and “dependent nations” they are inside and outside at the same time. 
Their presence demands law—the petition, the recognition claim—even as this 
demand simultaneously seeks an exception to law in that officials have the 
discretion to decide what presence means, acting according to what has been 
termed “administrative grace”8 or the government’s “pleasure,”9 in a manner “not 
subject to be controlled by the judicial department.”10 Such discretion is the 
essence of plenary power through which both immigrants and indigenous people 
are governed. The plenary power doctrine, established in the 1880s through a 
series of Supreme Court decisions, thus writes exceptionality into law in a 
paradoxical way: the judiciary allows government action by exempting such action 
from judicial review. As a legal doctrine, plenary power is thus authorized by 
courts through the suspension of their own authority.11  
                                                          
5. Justin Richland, Field Notes (Nov. 2011) (on file with author).  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Compean, 24 I & N Dec. 710, 710 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I & N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). 
9. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
10. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
11. This, perhaps, is an instance of the sovereign exception, what Agamben, Cormack, and 
others have called “the potentializing limits” of law. The court authorizes tacitly by announcing that it 
cannot judge. The court’s suspension of its own authority works to authorize the power of Congress. 
See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 44–45 (Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., 1998); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter 
Benjamin, in POTENTIALITIES: COLLECTED ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 160 (Daniel Heller-Roazen ed. & 
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In this Article, we examine the form and temporality of plenary power as 
applied to immigrants and indigenous peoples. To do so, we consider several of 
the founding cases through which plenary power was established, focusing on 
their annunciatory-yet-citational quality. Such cases are annunciatory in that, by 
proclaiming that the U.S. government has plenary power (i.e., full and complete 
power, free from judicial review, in certain substantive areas) the court in these 
cases enacts the very power that it announces. They are also citational in that the 
court does so in a manner that assumes such power always already exists. 
Moreover, the court announces this power through a denial of its own power, a 
denial that defers not only to the executive and legislative branches of U.S. 
government, but also to the future. This deference adopts the form of a citation to 
precedent, though the prior authority that is being cited to is nothing more than 
the “self-evidence” of plenary power as something inherent to sovereign nation-
states more generally.  
In Part I, we analyze the nature of plenary power, its place within but also 
somewhat beyond the law, its function of granting “fullness” to the United States 
while at the same time requiring certain populations to routinely claim 
exceptionality. In Part II, we turn to founding case law, and in Part III, to the 
present circumstances that immigrant and indigenous populations encounter when 
confronting the United States’ plenary power over them. Looking not only at 
courts’ decisions, but also at record making and keeping, we suggest that the 
practices through which immigrants and the indigenous seek recognition from the 
U.S. government are also products of plenary power. The legacy of plenary power 
can thus be found in the routine exceptionality that is produced through mundane 
immigration and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) procedures. By routine 
exceptionality, we mean the regular exercise of, and encounter with, a uniquely 
unfettered political power that groups like immigrants and indigenous peoples face 
by virtue of their status under specific regimes of U.S. law. Hence, like the 
founding cases, the federal agencies’ administrative practices—receiving evidence, 
maintaining records, generating decisions—give content to the forms of plenary 
power first announced in the suspension of court review of such official actions. 
The net effect is that officials are enabled to decide the status of immigrants and 
indigenous peoples, but via a calculation that remains almost entirely hidden but 
for the traces it leaves in statements about the value of particular kinds of proof 
for establishing those statuses. And though such official actions take on the veneer 
of legal form—in both the ideational sense of routine formula, but also in actual 
documents and texts—these practices also announce, point to, and give authority 
to that which is silent in the Constitution, that which is outside the four corners of 
the founding text. But ironically, rather than suggesting the extraconstitutional 
                                                                                                                                       
trans., 1999) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, POTENTIALITIES]; GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 
38–39 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION]; BRADIN 
CORMACK, A POWER TO DO JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, ENGLISH LITERATURE, AND THE RISE OF 
COMMON LAW, 1509–1625, at 9 (2007). 
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authority of certain aspects of U.S. political power, these official actions actually 
fill in its gaps, revealing the moment of “full administrative power”12 in which, to 
quote Walter Benjamin, “the separation of lawmaking and law-preserving violence 
is suspended.”13 The suspension of this separation produces an irresolution,14 a 
movement between rule and exception, law and the extralegal, sovereignty and 
dependency, absence and presence, promise and revocation. It is this irresolution, 
this back-and-forth movement, that is the essence of plenary power. 
I. PLENARY POWER AND THE FULLNESS OF LAW  
In this Part of our Article, we explore the origins and nature of plenary 
power as exercised in relation to immigrants and the indigenous, and we also 
examine the implications of our analysis for sociolegal theory. In particular, we 
suggest that binaries between law as characterized by “gaplessness” or “gaps” and 
as sometimes inert (“on-the-books”) and sometimes active (“in-action”) are 
unsustainable.15 In the case of plenary power, law “on-the-books” is “law-in-
action,” a fusion that is enabled by the paradoxical move of granting legal 
authority to decide according to extralegal criteria such as pleasure, will, grace, 
judgment, political considerations, foreign policy, or national security. Our point is 
not that the decision made via plenary power necessarily condemns by rendering 
people deportable or dependent, nor that it permits a benevolence, an 
“administrative grace”16 through which the U.S. government generously or 
humanely deigns to recognize legal presence or nationhood. Rather, the ability to 
damn or be merciful speaks of the theological alchemy by which administrators 
                                                          
12. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902)).  
13. WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277, 286 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978). 
14. Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 543, 562 (1988); cf. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Telling Stories in the Law and in Ordinary Life: 
The Oresteia and “Noon Wine,” in HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 168, 190 (1985). In his reading of Aeschylus’s Oresteia and the mythic cycle of revenge killing in 
the House of Atreus that eventually leads to the founding of Athenian law, White describes the world 
as “an utterly impossible world without law, in which no one can maintain a story of his or her life 
. . . . Every version is partial . . . .” Id. But with the invention of law, we see no easy resolution, says 
White, but rather an institution “where the different versions [of disputed events] can be placed in 
open comparison and competition, where the contraries can be comprehended within a larger 
whole.” Id. With the creation of law, and the force that comes with it, we may indeed be able to access 
a larger whole from which to view competing claims, but do we necessarily find from that perch a 
view that is more coherent or resolved?  
15. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF REAL LAW 94–115 (2010) (describing the gap between “law-on-the-books” and “law-in-
action” with various examples); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING 
TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 95 (2007) (citing SUSAN U. PHILIPS, IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE 
OF JUDGES: HOW JUDGES PRACTICE LAW, POLITICS, AND COURTROOM CONTROL 28 (1998)) 
(referencing an “intertextual gap” between written and spoken law); Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, 
Profession, Science, and Culture: An Emergent Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 30, 33–34 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (discussing the empirical 
study of “law-in-action”).  
16. Compean, supra note 8. 
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work up the United States as a nation whose contours are figured through the 
auditing of its aliens, whether they are immigrants or indigenous, or as matter-of-
fact nationals of external U.S. colonies or even, in another era, African 
American.17  
In fact, this alchemy is blatant, as indicated by Justice Field writing the 
opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), to which we 
return below: “[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their 
subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to 
independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of 
its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.”18 As Justice 
Field states, exercising power in relation to the subjects or citizens of foreign 
countries maintains the absolute independence of the United States as one nation. 
The exercise of this power is thus the law, but also beyond the law. In Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock,19 the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Congress could unilaterally 
abrogate its treaty obligations to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache nations in 
Oklahoma, and the question of whether such abrogation violated the so-called 
“trust responsibility” that the federal government owed Native Nations was not a 
question available for legal review by the Supreme Court. In so doing, the Court 
would uphold the constitutionality of the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887,20 
otherwise known as the General Allotment Act, which authorized the allotment, 
privatization, and sale of reservation lands previously held in trust by the U.S. 
government for native nations, setting in motion a series of events that would 
result in the dispossession of nearly ninety million acres of tribal territory, or sixty 
percent of the land base once reserved for Native Nations, before its reversal in 
1934.21  
                                                          
17. The plenary power doctrine was first developed to justify the exclusion of Chinese 
immigrants, but it then was routinely applied to American Indian nations and residents of external 
U.S. colonies such as Puerto Rico. See NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, An Authority Unchallengeable and 
Complete: Plenary Power Over Immigrants, American Indians, and External U.S. Colonies, in FROM CHINESE 
EXCLUSION TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 13 (2007). 
Moreover, long before the plenary power doctrine was established in such terms, African Americans, 
especially fugitive slaves, had also been made alien and subject to the implied power of Congress. E.g., 
Prigg v. Pensylvannia, 41 U.S. 539, 622–25 (1842). For recent discussions of Prigg, see Sora Y. Han, 
The Long Shadow of Racial Profiling, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 77, 96 (2012), which discusses how the 
Court created a structural framework to resolve the tension between federal and state laws regarding 
slaves. See also Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 428–29 (2011) (criticizing Justice 
Story’s opinion as “indefensible”); Sanford Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? 
Why Prigg Is Worse than Dred Scott (but Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 
23, 31 (2011) (noting that Prigg can be cited as “supporting plenary power by Congress whenever it 
believes it is facing a basic threat to the Republic”). For reasons of space, this Article will mainly focus 
on the routine exceptionality of the plenary power doctrine as applied to immigrants and indigenous 
peoples. 
18. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). 
19. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).  
20. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (repealed in part 1934). 
21. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2012). 
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To explain its decision in Lone Wolf, the Court argued that it had no power to 
review Congress’s actions toward Native Nations. As the Court explained, 
“[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by 
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”22 
Lone Wolf is thus a legal decision not to decide questions of the exercise of powers 
that “from the beginning”—at whatever point in the mists of sovereign time23 this 
points to—somehow stand as prior to it. Declaring that the United States has 
plenary power in certain areas of law is an illocutionary legal act: it brings this 
power into being by calling it forth, and finding its limit there. 
Indeed, efforts by the Supreme Court to locate the source of plenary power 
quickly take them past the Constitution, the source of their authority, and in 
search of some power that inheres in sovereignty itself. Thus in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright,24 Justice Sutherland writes that not all executive power comes from 
the Constitution: “The broad statement that the federal government can exercise 
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such 
implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated 
powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.”25  
Other “external” powers vest in the federal government not because they are 
mentioned in the Constitution, but “as necessary concomitants of nationality.”26 
These powers include, as might be expected, the authority to declare war and sue 
for peace, to enter into diplomatic relations, and also, notably for this Article, 
“[t]he power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation . . . [and] the power 
to expel undesirable aliens . . . .”27 Such powers are, for Sutherland, thus the very 
stuff of sovereignty, though ones that, because they pulse at its very core and 
foundation, are beyond and therefore not restricted by the laws of the states that 
deploy them. “Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government 
change; but sovereignty survives . . . . Sovereignty is never held in suspense.”28 
While the scope of the powers conferred by sovereignty is not particularly 
surprising, especially today, in the wake of the post-9/11 U.S. interventions in the 
Middle East, the force of plenary power and the present absence of its juridical 
review are nonetheless troubling. Indeed, performing the limits of judicial power 
seems not only to announce the existence of plenary power, but also to help bring 
it into being in the first place. This statement is borne out by Sutherland’s opinion 
                                                          
22. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. 
23. See Justin B. Richland, Sovereign Time, Storied Moments: The Temporalities of Law, Tradition, and 
Ethnography in Hopi Tribal Court, 31 POLAR 8, 10 (2008) (describing “sovereign time” as a kind of 
“space-time” envelope characteristic of Euro-American legal discourses and practices, which have 
been imported into contemporary Hopi tribal law through its adoption of Anglo-American style 
courtroom practices). 
24. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
25. Id. at 315–16. 
26. Id. at 318. 
27. Id. (citations omitted).  
28. Id. at 316–17. 
           
104 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:97 
in Curtiss-Wright, and remains true today. Thus, while plenary power is something 
of a legal black box—legal analysis on the part of the Court typically ends with the 
determination that the authority in question is a political one beyond legal 
review—this box is neither empty nor inert. Rather, it has been given an outer 
shape by case law, filled with force, and given the authoritative name of plenary 
power without ever having to disclose its content. 
We wonder then, whether bringing into view two of plenary power’s 
subjects—immigrants and indigenous people—might make it possible to discern 
the workings of plenary power through a sidelong glance, like looking at an eclipse 
by the shadow it casts on a wall. Thus by exploring the manner in which 
indigenous and immigrant subjects prepare and produce documents in response to 
federal regulations like those described above, we have begun to detect its rather 
distorting effects—effects such as retroactively reconstituting facts, rendering time 
multidirectional, and the specters of fraud and betrayal haunting documentary 
claims even before they are made. It is in the black box of plenary power that “the 
national government may enjoy inherent, extraconstitutional sovereign powers” 
even as “[i]t is precisely the concept of a national government with limited powers, 
based on a written constitution, and subject to constitutional constraints and 
judicial review, that is supposed to distinguish the American democratic 
experiment from authoritarian forms of government.”29 Clearly, the ability to use 
limited (judicial) powers to enable unlimited extraconstitutional (political) ones 
depends on defining the nation in relation to its territorially present “others.” 
“Immigrant” and “indigenous” people are only such when they are within U.S. 
territory, even as these designations mark them as outside—and, as we shall 
discuss, they can be treated as legally outside even as their presence is what gives 
the United States the authority to act over them. In the case of plenary power 
doctrine, this legal authorization of the sovereign will, law is characterized neither 
by gaps nor by gaplessness, but rather by embodiment in material, yet moving, 
form—a dance rather than a text. 
By considering Native Americans and immigrants together, we return to 
groups that, historically, were interlinked in the creation of plenary powers, and we 
also refuse the current distinctions between “natives” and “foreigners” that 
underlie dominant groups’ claims to have the right to regulate resident immigrants 
and Indians.30 Historically, the genocide of Native Americans was cited as 
precedent for the ability to exclude or deport noncitizens.31 Thus, in 1882, as the 
                                                          
29. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). 
30. As we note above, slaves and colonial subjects have also been key to the construction of 
plenary power. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
31. Significantly, and in a similar fashion, an infamous slavery case was cited in another 
landmark case of plenary power doctrine. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, was indeed cited by both the judges of 
the majority and the dissenting judges in the key insular case, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 250, 360 
(1901), which recognized Congress’ plenary power to acquire territory, but also denied that Puerto 
Rico was within the United States. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney concluded that people of African 
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Chinese Exclusion Act was being debated, California Senator John F. Miller 
asserted,  
One complete man, the product of free institutions and a high 
civilization, is worth more to the world than hundreds of barbarians. 
Upon what other theory can we justify the almost complete 
extermination of the Indian, the original possessor of all these States? I 
believe that one such man as Washington, or Newton, or Franklin, or 
Lincoln glorifies the Creator of the world and benefits mankind more 
than all the Chinese who have lived, and struggled, and died on the banks 
of the Hoang Ho.32 
More recently, as nativism in the United States has flourished,33 the U.S. 
mainstream has defined itself at once as “settlers” only in contrast to a 
disappearing indigenous population, but more often as “native” in contrast to 
aliens arriving from beyond U.S. borders. Examining immigration and federal 
recognition claims together destabilizes such definitions, as the mainstream 
paradoxically becomes “settler” and “native.”  
In sum, federal law regarding Indians and immigrants relies on the power 
that accrues to nation-states by positioning persons, places, and practices as 
exceptions, outside the norm, where rule can be suspended in favor of political 
will.34 We turn now to the cases through which this power was established.  
  
                                                                                                                                       
descent could not be citizens, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 413, but he also rejected the notion of an 
unfettered Congressional power to conquer territory and govern it at its behest, id. at 447–48. In 
Downes, 182 U.S. at 274–77, Justice Brown distinguished Dred Scott and rejected the anti-imperialist 
vision of Justice Taney. He seemed, however, to share his racist vision of citizenship. See Downes, 182 
U.S. at 279–80 (stating an implied denial of the right of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico to American 
citizenship, and suggesting that some peoples are foreign to American habits, traditions, and modes of 
life). According to Sanford Levinson, in the end, “[n]o one can read Downes without realizing the 
extent to which the ‘un-Americanness’ of the people in the new American territories is fundamental 
to the outcome.” Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in 
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 121, 129–31 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
32. 13 CONG. REC. 1,487 (1882) (statement of Sen. Miller). 
33. See LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, 
AND THE NATION 3 (2008) (discussing nativism in the context of the “Latino Threat Narrative”); Joe 
R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW 
NATIVISM AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) 
(describing recent nativists’ desire to keep the United States primarily white and European); George J. 
Sánchez, Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in Late Twentieth Century America, 31 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1009, 1009 (discussing the recent rise of a racial nativism that combines a 
new form of racism with traditional hostility towards immigrants); see generally JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925 (1963) (discussing 
nativism throughout the history of the United States).  
34. See AGAMBEN, POTENTIALITIES, supra note 11, at 160–76; AGAMBEN, STATE OF 
EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 39. 
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II. ORIGINARY MOMENTS 
The plenary power doctrine, especially in the realm of immigration law, has 
been described as a “constitutional oddity.”35 In Part II, we consider two 
foundational cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1880s: the Chinese 
Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States)36, and United States v. Kagama.37 In 
these cases, the Court carved out something of an exception: because regulating 
aliens who immigrated into U.S. territory and/or who made up domestic 
dependent Indian nations within U.S. borders is a matter of national sovereignty, 
Congress has “unfettered power” that is not subject to judicial review.38 This 
power is justified sometimes by reference to the Constitution, but sometimes (as 
Justice Sutherland does in his opinion in Curtiss-Wright) to a power that pre-exists 
it, a political force inherent in sovereignty more generally, of which the U.S. 
government is only the most recent instantiation. As such, and like the immigrant 
and indigenous subjects to which it is applied, these cases constitute plenary 
power as a kind of present absence, citations to it in the Constitution point to 
something that is not there. As Augustine-Adams notes, the Justice who wrote the 
opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case “linked the exercise of that sovereignty to the 
Constitution, but did so without specific textual support or citation . . . .”39 The 
cases that cite the plenary power of the United States in fact stand as its only real 
textual instantiation—the announcement is the founding of this doctrine, but also 
one that denies its role and authority in so doing. At the same time, these cases 
transcend the contexts of their own announcement of plenary power, in that they 
return to and reconstruct the supposed meaning of the Constitution, and U.S. 
power more generally, imbuing the Constitution with a quality that it did not have 
previously but that it is now found to always already have.  
This janus-faced performativity—an efficacious discursive act that denies its 
own efficacy—unfolds repeatedly in the Supreme Court decisions that draw on 
the plenary power doctrine, particularly in articulations of federal power vis-à-vis 
immigrants and Native Americans.40 Therefore, far from being a “constitutional 
oddity,”41 we argue, plenary power takes on something of a founding character 
                                                          
35. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 
SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255; see also Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. 
REV. 965, 974–75 (discussing sovereignty theory as a unifying explanation for the plenary power 
doctrine). 
36. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
37. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
38. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
701, 702 (2005). 
39. Id. at 713. 
40. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987) (discussing the constitutional limits on 
the Congress’ plenary power); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984) (referring to the “judiciary’s frequent invocation of 
federal plenary power over Indian affairs” as curious because “the Constitution does not explicitly . . . 
regulate Indian affairs”). 
41. Legomsky, supra note 35, at 255. 
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insofar as it gives “fullness” to the United States and the laws by which it acts in 
relation to those “aliens” (indigenous and immigrant) whose presence within its 
borders troubles the imagined veneer of its uniform, territorially contiguous, 
“modular” sovereignty.42  
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, 
concerned the ability of the U.S. government to exclude Chae Chan Ping, a 
Chinese immigrant, even though he had been issued a reentry certificate, and even 
though U.S. treaties with China had recognized “the free migration and emigration 
of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other, for 
purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.”43 Chae Chan Ping had 
immigrated to the United States from China in 1875, taking up residence in San 
Francisco. In 1882, the U.S. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which 
forbid further immigration of Chinese laborers, but which allowed those who 
were already in the United States to obtain a certificate that would allow them to 
reenter the country after leaving.44 Chae Chan Ping obtained such a certificate, 
and, in 1887, twelve years after first entering, returned to China for a visit. In 
September 1888, he set sail for the United States once again, but while he was en 
route, Congress enacted new legislation that revoked the reentry certificates that 
had been previously issued.45 When he landed in San Francisco, he was detained 
by the Captain of his steamship, whereupon he in turn submitted a writ of habeas 
corpus, alleging that his detention was unlawful, and the law upon which it was 
based, the Chinese Exclusion Act, was itself an unconstitutional exercise of federal 
power. His complaint was heard and denied by the Circuit Court of the Northern 
District of California,46 and then was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
unanimously found his detention and exclusion to be lawful.47  
The Court’s reasoning in Chae Chan Ping demonstrates how plenary power’s 
originary moments appear to follow rather than to found. Thus, writing for the 
Court, Justice Field asserts:  
That the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over 
                                                          
42. See Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and American Indian 
Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239, 240 (2005) (discussing various types of indigenous space utilized 
by American Indians to challenge the “modular” sovereignty of the United States); see also FRANK 
POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 139–
40 (2009) (discussing the Lone Wolf Court’s view of plenary power as a “clear highway” for “unilateral 
expansion of federal land acquisition and power in Indian affairs”). For an immigration example, see 
Susan Bibler Coutin, Being En Route, 107 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 195 (2005), where she writes 
that “exclusion created territorial gaps—the space occupied by the person deemed to be legally 
outside of the United States. Thus, for territories to have integrity, territorial disruptions were 
required.”  
43. Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-China, art. V, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740.  
44. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
45. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943). 
46. In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431 (1888). 
47. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. 
It is a part of its independence.48 
In this passage, Justice Field presents the government’s power to exclude as 
an already established fact, grounded in sovereign independence and jurisdiction, 
rather than as a doctrine that is being created in the very moment that it is 
announced. And yet, as we argue, Justice Field’s opinion constitutes just this kind 
of foundational announcement of the doctrine of plenary power over immigrants, 
precisely by denying that this is what it is doing. Such a founding is accomplished 
by the Court through a deferral of the Court’s own authority, both by reference to 
a supposedly taken-for-granted notion of the sovereign power to exclude, and by 
the limits such power imposes on the Court’s capacity to decide such matters as a 
question of law. To again quote Justice Field: 
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, 
or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its 
action, ought to have qualified its inhibition [of Chinese laborers], and 
made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the 
passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination.49 
In place of judicial determination, Justice Field asserts, immigration will be 
regulated by “sovereign will,”50 the government’s “judgment,”51 and the “pleasure 
of congress.”52 Substituting political will for legal judgment explicitly 
acknowledges that, though authorized through legal deference, plenary power is a 
naked form of power, apparently inherent in sovereignty. As Augustine-Adams 
notes, “The plenary power doctrine at least recognizes that the exclusion of 
noncitizens is an exercise of power, rather than justified by principle, 
constitutional or otherwise. The plenary power doctrine calls a spade a spade; the 
United States, and other countries, exclude noncitizens as a matter of power and 
privilege.”53 As an act of discretion, plenary power is set aside from constitutional 
law, making it extraconstitutional54 and unenumerated.55  
But significantly, as it gains legal authority when it is found to have its source 
                                                          
48. Id. at 603–04. 
49. Id. at 609. 
50. Id. at 600. 
51. Id. at 606. 
52. Id. at 600. 
53. Augustine-Adams, supra note 38, at 745; see also Newton, supra note 40, at 196 (“The 
judiciary’s frequent invocation of federal plenary power over Indian affairs is curious since the 
Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government a general power to regulate Indian 
affairs. One suspects, therefore, that, as in other areas of constitutional law, the terms ‘plenary power’ 
and ‘political question’ are not so much justifications for decisional outcomes as they are restatements 
of the Court’s intent to defer to the other branches of government and, concomitantly, to abdicate 
any role in defining the unique status of Indian tribes in our constitutional system or accommodating 
their legitimate claims of tribal sovereignty and preservation of property.”) (footnotes omitted). 
54. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 38 at 712–13 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
justification of the plenary power as extraconstitutional); see also Cleveland, supra note 29, at 7 n.25 
(examining extraconstitutionality as a possible basis for unenumerated governmental powers). 
55. Henkin, supra note 40, at 856. 
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in that power which precedes law, the doctrine of plenary authority nonetheless 
has the effect of returning to and reconstruing social facts in accordance with the 
political present and future it brings into being. Thus, although Chae Chan Ping 
resided in the United States for some twelve years, harmlessly as far as anyone 
knows, the decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case defined him and other Chinese 
laborers as foreign and as aggressors.56 Justice Field emphasizes that the Chinese 
“remained strangers in the land”57 and that “[t]hose laborers are not citizens of the 
United States; they are aliens.”58 As foreign subjects of another sovereign, the 
Chinese, Justice Field reasoned, threatened to “overrun”59 the United States, 
posing a “great danger”60 due to the “vast hordes”61 and “crowded millions”62 
who aggressed through “encroachment.”63 Indeed, though all that Chae Chan 
Ping had done was to visit China and then return, his reentry, in fact his mere 
presence, was deemed akin to an act of war: 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in 
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace 
and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there 
are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are 
subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the 
proceeding only more obvious and pressing.64 
Temporally, the Court’s claim that Congress could determine that Chinese 
laborers’ presence in the United States was something just short of military 
hostilities also gave Congress the ability to reconfigure the facts of Chae Chan 
Ping’s and other Chinese laborers’ lives. Although the validity of his reentry 
certificate was not challenged, Justice Field cited widespread fraud as having given 
the government a legitimate rationale for first limiting and then revoking the 
evidence—the reentry certificate—that would have permitted Chae Chan Ping to 
reenter the country. Perhaps the greatest factual revision of all was naming this 
case the Chinese “exclusion” case, when as Cleveland notes, Chae Chan Ping was 
being expelled.65 
Though much of the scholarship on Chinese Exclusion examines, as we have 
here, the rationales underlying plenary power, we wish to focus attention as well 
on an aspect of the case that is usually not discussed, namely, the reentry 
certificate that Chae Chan Ping had in his possession. What, precisely, was this 
                                                          
56. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal 
Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 45 (2010). 
57. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. 
58. Id. at 603. 
59. Id. at 595. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 606. 
62. Id. at 595. 
63. Id. at 606. 
64. Id. 
65. Cleveland, supra note 29, at 127. 
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document before it was revoked? Proof of identity? A promise? A contract? A 
record of prior presence? Though it may have been all of these things, we suggest 
that its most important feature was actually its intangibility. In other words, 
though Chae Chan Ping presumably carried his certificate as a material object with 
him while he left and returned to the United States, the document itself was 
imbued with a potentiality: despite whatever words appeared on its surface, it 
might or might not be regarded as valid and, at the “pleasure” of the U.S 
government, it might or might not permit him to reenter the country. Though 
perhaps marked by official stamps, the reentry certificate was indefinite, its 
features hiding another document that resided within: the potential revocation that 
would eventually emerge, with the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act amendment and 
with the steamship Captain’s decision to detain Chae Chan Ping. Much like Native 
Americans’ land, of which Congress dispossessed them through the Dawes 
Severalty Act of 1887, though only as a “‘mere change in the form of 
investment,’”66 the reentry that the document promised vanished through a mere 
redefinition of territorial presence.  
In fact, the revocability of his reentry document was prefigured by the 
Chinese Exclusion Act itself, long before Chae Chan Ping left U.S. shores. 
Although this act is known primarily for its racist exclusion of Chinese, in which 
“the opinion of the Government of the United States” about the danger posed by 
“the coming of Chinese laborers” is deemed sufficient to ban a whole class of 
persons,67 in fact, much of the Act’s text is taken up with mundane administrative 
details regarding how to adequately document the Chinese laborers who were 
already here. For example, section 4, which is the longest of the Act’s 15 sections, 
states: 
That for the purpose of properly identifying Chinese laborers who were 
in the United States on the seventeenth day of November, eighteen 
hundred and eighty, or who shall have come into the same before the 
expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and in order to 
furnish them with the proper evidence of their right to go from and come 
to the United States of their free will and accord, as provided by the 
treaty between the United States and China dated November 
seventeenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, the collector of customs of the 
district from which any such Chinese laborer shall depart from the 
United States shall, in person or by deputy, go on board each vessel 
having on board any such Chinese laborers and cleared or about to sail 
from his district for a foreign port, and on such vessel make a list of all 
such Chinese laborers, which shall be entered in registry-books to be kept 
for that purpose, in which shall be stated the name, age, occupation, last 
                                                          
66. Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere Change in the 
Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 39 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 
448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980)); see also Scaperlanda, supra note 35, at 988–89 (discussing the ways that the 
U.S. government can retract the “hospitality” that it offers immigrants). 
67. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, pmbl., 22 Stat. 58, 58 (repealed 1943). 
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place of residence, physical marks of peculiarities, and all facts necessary 
for the identification of each of such Chinese laborers, which books shall 
be safely kept in the custom-house; and every such Chinese laborer so 
departing from the United States shall be entitled to, and shall receive, 
free of any charge or cost upon application therefor, from the collector 
or his deputy, at the time such list is taken, a certificate, signed by the 
collector or his deputy and attested by his seal of office, in such form as 
the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, which certificate shall 
contain a statement of the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, 
personal description, and facts of identification of the Chinese laborer to 
whom the certificate is issued, corresponding with the said list and 
registry in all particulars. In case any Chinese laborer after having 
received such certificate shall leave such vessel before her departure he 
shall deliver his certificate to the master of the vessel, and if such Chinese 
laborer shall fail to return to such vessel before her departure from port 
the certificate shall be delivered by the master to the collector of customs 
for cancellation. The certificate herein provided for shall entitle the 
Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the 
United States upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of 
customs of the district at which such Chinese laborer shall seek to re-
enter; and upon delivery of such certificate by such Chinese laborer to the 
collector of customs at the time of re-entry in the United States said 
collector shall cause the same to be filed in the custom-house and duly 
canceled.68 
By conforming to the latest in identification technology,69 creating a registry 
against which certificates could be checked, and establishing penalties for fraud, 
the Act anticipates its own violation, thus creating the possibility for the very 
shadow documents that rendered Chae Chan Ping’s compliance with the Act’s 
terms both insubstantial and legally indefensible. Compliance meant assuming a 
particular stance regarding the U.S. government, as a racialized and foreign 
“other” who sought to invoke the U.S. government’s “pleasure” to allow the 
Chinese laborers already in the country to remain. Such a stance may have 
appeared fraudulent to many Chinese. Sarah Cleveland notes that after the Geary 
Act of 189270 required Chinese residents to carry a certificate of residence at all 
times, “a massive campaign of civil disobedience within the Chinese community” 
ensued.71  
Similar processes played out in relation to American Indian Tribes and the 
capacity of the United States to make and change laws that governed not only the 
                                                          
68. Id. § 4. 
69. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 121–27 (2001) (describing the various identification procedures used to 
issue “return certificates” to Chinese nationals). 
70. Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25, 25–26 (1892) (repealed 1943). 
71. Cleveland, supra note 29, at 138 (citing Ellen D. Katz, The Six Companies and the Geary Act: A 
Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Civil Disobedience and Civil Rights Litigation, 8 W. LEGAL HIST. 227, 253–
63 (1995)). 
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nation-to-nation relations between the two, but even the policing of relations 
between indigenous members of the same tribal nation, on tribally-held territory. 
Indeed, this is the central legal question before the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Kagama,72 in which the Court was asked to decide the legality of the arrest and 
detention by federal authorities of an Indian who was accused of killing another 
member of his tribe on the Hoopa Valley Reservation at the confluence of the 
Trinity and Klamath Rivers in the far northwestern corner of California. Federal 
authority to hear this case was claimed under the recently passed Major Crimes 
Act of 1885, in which Congress extended federal adjudicatory jurisdiction over 
certain named crimes73 when committed by one tribal member against another in 
“Indian Country,” a legal term of art that includes Indian reservations like the 
Hoopa Valley Reservation.74  
Passed just two years before the Dawes Act of 1887, the Major Crimes Act 
marked the first major intrusion into the internal sovereignty of tribal nations, an 
arena that, until that time, had generally been presumed to be in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the tribes themselves, particularly those that resided on 
reservations. Indeed, the law itself was hastily passed as a legislative fix to an 1883 
Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Crow Dog,75 involving similar facts of intertribal 
murder on the Brule Sioux Indian Reservation in the Dakota Territory, but in 
which the Supreme Court held that the federal authorities lacked the authority to 
take jurisdiction over the case. 
As a brief decision “not known for its coherence or clarity,”76 it is not 
surprising that the statement of the facts in Justice Samuel Miller’s 1886 opinion in 
United States v. Kagama77 are perhaps more interesting for what they don’t reveal 
than for what they do. All we are told of the facts is that “in two counts . . . 
Kagama, alias Pactah Billy, an Indian, murdered Iyouse, alias Ike, another Indian, 
at Humboldt County, in the state of California, within the limits of the Hoopa 
Valley reservation . . . .”78 Never mentioned is the fact that, according to 
ethnohistorian Sydney Harring, neither Kagama nor Iyose were actually members 
                                                          
72. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886). 
73. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2012)). The original act, passed as a legislative rider to the Indian Appropriations Bill of 1885, 
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75. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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77. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376. 
78. Id. 
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of the Hupa tribe—both were Yurok, a distinct people with an entirely different 
language—nor were they living on the Hoopa Valley Reservation.79 It turns out 
the two were neighbors, whose homesteads existed on a narrow valley on a lower 
branch of the Klamath River just north of the Reservation.80 Thus even the killing 
itself, which took place at Iyose’s homestead, was not on Reservation land.  
Given these errors in fact, it seems plain to Harring that federal jurisdiction 
in general, and the Major Crimes Act in particular, should not have been extended 
to this case, and “the Supreme Court could not have issued the Kagama decision at 
all.”81 The errors themselves seem to be traceable to a number of 
misrepresentations of both Kagama’s and Iyose’s places of residence, and their 
identities, in several different federal records, including censuses taken by the 
Hoopa Valley Indian Agent between 1880 and 1891, as well as some official 
correspondence between the Indian Agent, Major Charles Porter, and then 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Hiram Price, a man most famous, or infamous, 
for his pushing forward with the allotment and assimilation policies of the Dawes 
Act.  
In many of the federal records regarding the Hoopa Valley Reservation, and 
its Agent Porter, the name Pactah Billy appears as sometimes residing on the 
Hoopa Reservation, sometimes off, and always of a more indeterminate tribal 
affiliation, being described as a Klamath Indian, that is, an Indian living along the 
Klamath River.82 In much the same way then that the social facts of Chae Chan 
Ping’s residence certificate before and after the 1888 Amendment to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act change, the residency records and even tribal affiliation of Pactah 
Billy seem to flicker, first in and then out, of the relevant federal jurisdiction.  
Equally important, however, is the extent to which, like in Justice Field’s 
opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, none of these factual inconsistencies seem to 
matter to the Court in its ultimate resolution of the question regarding the U.S. 
government’s power to regulate intratribal affairs. As Harring notes, the rapidity 
with which the Kagama case makes its way through the federal courts—from arrest 
in June 1885 to Miller’s opinion in May 1886—seems to suggest the extent to 
which the case was singled out by federal prosecutors to be a test case for 
determining the validity of the newly minted Major Crimes Act, legislation that the 
Supreme Court all but directed be pursued by Congress in the language of Ex 
Parte Crow Dog.83 This context gives the outcome in the Kagama case the sense of 
a kind of fait accompli. As Harring writes, “[f]ederal courts have often created 
doctrines through case law that . . . [have] nothing to do with the Indian people 
                                                          
79. Harring, supra note 76, at 152 (discussing the tribal languages and tribal identifications of 
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80. Id. at 153–54. 
81. Id. at 152. 
82. Id. at 152–53. 
83. Id. at 173 (citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568–69 (1883)). 
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involved. Kagama fits perfectly into this pattern: the actual case had nothing to do 
with the doctrine.”84 
Little wonder then that Miller’s opinion moves quickly from its brief one-
sentence description of the facts straight to the question of the legitimacy of the 
Major Crimes Act, and the federal jurisdiction over Kagama claimed in its name. 
And here Miller is at least more emphatic, if not more clear, in what he sees as the 
source of Congress’ authority to pass such laws. In particular, he is careful to point 
out that this authority does not come, as had been argued by the attorney from the 
United States, from the constitutional doctrine known as the Indian Commerce 
Clause, which gives Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”85 He 
writes,  
This clause is relied on in the argument in the present case . . . [b]ut we 
think it would be a very strained construction of this clause that a system 
of criminal laws for Indians . . . was authorized by the grant of power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.86  
And with that, Miller acknowledges, if only to set to one side, the 
constitutional source of Congressional authority over Indian affairs, which had 
heretofore been the most common source for understanding the federal 
government’s exclusive authority in determining the government-to-government 
relationship with Indian tribes.87 Instead, and making explicit reference to the fact 
that “these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States,” Miller 
concludes that: 
[T]his power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make 
laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the 
constitution . . . as from the ownership of the country in which the 
territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in 
the national government, and can be found nowhere else.88 
And so, much as in the Chae Chan Ping decision three years hence, plenary 
power over Indians is announced/founded in the alchemy of a case law decision 
that locates a power beyond its ken, in a murky doctrine of sovereign power that is 
grounded in itself, if only because it “can be found nowhere else.”89  
Legal scholars differ about whether to regard Chae Chan Ping, or Kagama, as a 
“constitutional fossil,”90 a relic of a prior era, “exist[ing] in a time warp”91 or as an 
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85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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88. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379–80 (citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)). 
89. Id. 
90. Henkin, supra note 40, at 862. 
91. Scaperlanda, supra note 35, at 975. 
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integral part of the U.S. legal system, one that is “very much alive and well.”92 We 
suspect that both are right, that these cases were products of a particular historical 
era93 but that at the same time, plenary power also enables federal law regarding 
Indians and immigrants. To suggest how this is the case, we turn now to the 
contemporary period, and to the legal claims staked by the Native American Tribal 
Nation and by Central Americans. 
III. ROUTINE EXCEPTIONALITY, OR HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT 
Insofar as, in the United States, alien subjects create a gap in law’s reach 
across the nation, we suggest that it is precisely in the documents that shape their 
lives and that are deployed in petitions for federal recognition that the ambiguous, 
odd, undetermined quality of plenary power’s force can be best discerned. Indians 
and immigrants who seek recognition occupy a moment and space before plenary 
power acts. They are therefore shaped by a future that reaches into their present, 
reconstituting the facts of their lives even as they are lived. In this sense, they are 
constituted in key ways by a future that they do not control even as their efforts to 
reach this future compel them to produce evidence, to document their present and 
past existence, to become particular sorts of characters, and to insist on the 
validity of realities that ought to be taken as self-evident; that a tribe is a tribe, that 
a resident is a resident, that a relation is kin. Their insistence on trying to prove the 
obvious, however, is easily misconstrued as fraud—and not only out of biases that 
regard immigrants and the indigenous as particularly devious, due to being “special 
interests” or “illegals.” In addition, assertions of a transcendent sovereignty that 
survives changes of ruler and regime may cover a fear that in fact the nation is not 
sovereign, that it can be manipulated by immigrant or indigenous people who are 
suspected of deploying fraudulent documents. To be defrauded is perhaps the 
antithesis of the sovereign who rules by will, therefore, detecting fraud must be 
one of the sovereign’s key capacities. Haunted by the specter of fraud that lies 
beyond law—like the plenary power that is grounded in the silence of the 
Constitution94—the documents held and produced by the nation’s immigrant and 
indigenous others become intangible. They, much like the textual basis for plenary 
power, may not entirely be there, specters that flicker at the edges of the state’s 
gaze, visible only through a sidelong glance. 
Our analysis focuses on the experiences of Central Americans, who 
                                                          
92. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” 
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 13 (2003).  
93. Lindsay, supra note 56, at 32–33. Lindsay “argue[s] that immigration exceptionalism is the 
product of a deep antagonism between the nation’s republican political-economic principles and the 
unprecedented social and economic dislocations wrought by the industrialization of the northern 
economy.” Id. at 6. His explanation: “[B]oth the cultural and legal origins of modern immigration 
exceptionalism lie in a highly contingent, historically novel association between foreign pauper labor 
and foreign aggression that, for contemporaries, warranted categorically defining all laws touching on 
immigration as matters of national self-preservation.” Id. at 32–33. 
94. For a discussion of the U.S. Constitution’s silence regarding race in the context of Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, see Han, supra note 17, at 89–97. 
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immigrated to the United States in large numbers during Central American civil 
wars of the 1980s and 1990s, and who have been awarded a variety of temporary 
statuses, only some of which lead to citizenship95; and on a Southern California 
tribal nation whose recent denial of federal recognition is currently on petition for 
reconsideration after the Secretary of the Interior determined that some evidence 
had been overlooked and, in December 2013, recommended that the Department 
of Interior reconsider the case.96 There are striking parallels in the legal histories of 
these groups. During the 1980s, one of the few ways for Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans to avoid deportation was to apply for political asylum, yet their 
applications were denied at rates of approximately ninety-seven percent and 
ninety-nine percent respectively.97 In response, various nonprofit, religious, and 
legal advocacy organizations formed coalitions to press the cause at all levels of 
city, state, and federal government. Through several landmark political and legal 
developments, including passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) in 1986,98 a legal settlement in the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh 
case,99 and the award of Temporary Protected Status in 1990 (due to the civil 
war)100 and again in 2001 (following the Salvadoran earthquakes),101 a new 
regulatory regime was established. This regime simultaneously allowed some to 
gain legal permanent residency, kept others in “temporary statuses” that Cecilia 
Menjívar has described as a “liminal legality”102 and put in place stricter controls 
for those who remained undocumented. In this context, “papers” have taken on 
new, yet unpredictable, significance.  
In 1982, around the same time that large-scale migration from Central 
America began, the tribal nation of which we write filed their first letter of intent 
with the BIA’s Branch of Acknowledgement and Research (BAR), initiating their 
effort to become a “federally recognized tribal nation” pursuant to the Indian 
                                                          
95. CECILIA MENJÍVAR, FRAGMENTED TIES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANT NETWORKS IN 
AMERICA 80–89 (2000) (describing the U.S. government’s reactions to Salvadoran immigrants). 
96. Brian Park, Dept. of Interior to Reconsider Federal Recognition for Juaneño Tribe, CAPISTRANO 
DISPATCH (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.thecapistranodispatch.com/dept-of-interior-to-reconsider-
federal-recognition-for-juaneno-tribe/. 
97. JAMES SILK, U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING 
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Virginia Hamilton ed., 1986). 
98. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
99. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Carolyn Patty 
Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central 
American Asylum-Seekers, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 353–55 (1991). 
100. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030–38 (1990). 
101. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS & 
ANSWERS: TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS (TPS) FOR EL SALVADORANS (2001), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/TPSQ_030201.pdf. 
102. Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United 
States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999 (2006) (examining the effects of legal statutes on the lives of immigrants); 
see also Alison Mountz et al., Lives in Limbo: Temporary Protected Status and Immigrant Identities, 2 GLOBAL 
NETWORKS 335, 337, 341–46 (2002) (discussing Salvadorans who applied for asylum in the United 
States but were granted Temporary Protected Status). 
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Reorganization Act of 1934.103 In so doing, they hoped to establish a government-
to-government relationship with the United States.104 Despite providing several 
hundred volumes of evidence of the presence of the tribal nation in historical 
records from 1780 to the present, as well as providing a detailed description of 
their current social, cultural, and political makeup as a distinct Indian group, their 
petition was cited by the BAR in 1990 as having “significant deficiencies.”105 
Members of the tribal leadership decided at that time to prepare a response, which 
was filed through the same bureaucratic process in 1993. The Tribe would wait 
another fourteen years for a reply, during which time the BAR was restructured, 
reorganized, and renamed the Office of Federal Acknowledgement (OFA), after a 
Government Accounting Office in 2001 found serious “weaknesses in the 
recognition processes.”106 And, as we write this, yet another round of proposed 
revisions to the Federal Acknowledgement Process is being undertaken by the 
BIA.107 
Legal exceptionality thus shapes the experiences of these and other 
immigrant and indigenous groups. Across the nation, including especially in the 
Southwest, the status of Native American tribes and their members as 
“exceptional” has been viewed so completely through the lens of high-stakes 
gaming opportunities that tribal people are more likely to find themselves tarred 
with the label “special interests” than “savages.”108 Defined this way, Indians’ 
claims to federal recognition as tribal nations are suspected of being grounded 
more in a desire for private gain than public good. At the same time, state 
                                                          
103. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012). 
104. See RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF TRIBAL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 18 (2005) (discussing how tribes could form a government-to-government 
relationship under the Indian Reorganization Act); BRUCE GRANVILLE MILLER, INVISIBLE 
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sovereignty that federal recognition provides to tribes). 
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RECOGNITION PROCESS 2 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0249.pdf. 
107. In June 2013, the BIA announced “a comment period, tribal consultation sessions, and 
public comment sessions on a preliminary discussion draft of potential revisions to improve the 
Federal acknowledgment process.” Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group 
Exists as an Indian Tribe, 78 Fed. Reg. 38,617, 38,617 (proposed June 27, 2013) (to be codified at 25 
C.F.R. pt. 83). 
108. KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POSTCOLONIAL 
POLITICS OF U.S.-INDIGENOUS RELATIONS 4, 9, 187 (2007); JESSICA R. CATTELINO, HIGH STAKES: 
FLORIDA SEMINOLE GAMING AND SOVEREIGNTY 164 (2008); see also EVE DARIAN-SMITH, NEW 
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AMERICAN LAND 33–34, 92 (2004) (juxtaposing the romanticized notion of Indians as noble savages 
with their capacity to operate as modern people).  
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legislation like Arizona S.B. 1070109 and the recent Alabama law110 take aim at 
policing the presence of immigrant populations in a manner previously 
understood as the sole purview of the federal government.111 Here, as well, 
immigrants are cast as seeking unfair advantage of public benefits that allegedly 
come at the expense of the citizenry. Exceptionality is at the heart of the 
“securitization” of U.S. immigration law as evidenced by the post-9/11 
reorganization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into the Department 
of Homeland Security and efforts to deport “criminal aliens,”112 while tribal 
economic development projects, including gaming operations, are required to add 
internal anti-money laundering protocols to comply with Title III of the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act.113  
To conclude, we return to the vignettes with which we began, indicating how 
efforts to seek federal recognition reveal the contours of plenary power and its 
routine application. The Southern California Tribal Nation’s frustration with the 
shifting genealogical standard to which they are held is grounded in their 
experience of justice as arbitrary, as following something other than a “rule.” 
When in 2007, the OFA finally did make a preliminary finding on their claim, it 
once again found the Tribal Nation’s petition lacking in proof sufficient to 
establish a legitimate claim for federal recognition. After amending and 
supplementing their petition, in Spring 2011, the OFA made its final 
determination that the Tribe had failed to meet all the required criteria set out in 
25 C.F.R. section 83.7, especially criteria (e), proving that its “membership consists 
of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe.”114 As was detailed in 
their final report, and published in the Federal Register, only fifty-three percent of 
the 455 living tribal members had established their descent from a known 
historical Indian tribe.115 In the Tribe’s appeal of the decision to the Interior 
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n.1 (Nicholas De Genova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010). 
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Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 296.  
114. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2013). 
115. 76 Fed. Reg. 54, 15,335–36 (Mar. 21, 2011). Though this report is a matter of public 
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Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA), among its chief complaints was the erroneous 
exclusion of an entire lineage of tribal members from the descent reckoning. 
When accurately accounted for, the Tribe’s appeal brief explained, the percentage 
of tribal members with proof of descent from a historical Indian tribe would 
return to nearly eighty-five percent. Significantly, in Fall 2011, the OFA 
acknowledged this error, but nonetheless stood by its final determination. In so 
doing, the OFA argued in its reply brief that even with the correction, the Tribe 
still did not meet the requirements of criteria (e), presumably (though the reply 
doesn’t make this explicit) on an interpretation of the statutory provision that 
“petitioner’s membership consist of individuals who descend from a historical 
Indian tribe,” as requiring that all members (and not just a majority) have proof of 
such descent. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that in private meetings 
the OFA staff researchers had commended the Tribal Nation’s petition and its 
supporting evidence as the most comprehensive they had seen in the history of 
the office. This commendation raises the question: Was the same interpretation of 
criteria (e) applied to the seventeen tribes that have been federally recognized by 
this or related processes since 1978? And of course, as per the Tribal Chairman 
himself, this requirement has not been applied to the other 548 federally 
recognized tribes whose tribal rolls have never been submitted to such vetting 
because their juridico-political existence has been established by other means.  
Though it remains to be seen whether and how these matters will be 
resolved, the effects of criteria (e) have already been felt by the Tribe and its 
membership. In 2008, the Chairman and the rest of the Tribal Council of the 
Tribe made news when they ousted certain members from their numbers. Though 
the ousted individuals contend that their removal has more to do with internecine 
politics and the undue influence of the Catholic Church, among other factors, 
tribal leaders contend that the issue is one of simple genealogy. This claim is made 
despite the fact that certain members of the ousted group had evidence that they 
or their parents or grandparents were, at least at one time, recognized by the 
federal government as Indian for its purposes, specifically in the form of the 
aforementioned Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood issued in the 1920s and 
valid still to this day, although the OFA itself has cast doubt on such certificates’ 
sufficiency for meeting criteria (e). Also notable is that the ousted group also 
includes a past Chairman of the Tribe and other relatives of the Chairman 
responsible for starting the acknowledgement process back in the early 1980s. 
Likewise, Amalia Gomez Mendoza’s effort to petition for her son Marco 
must contend with the U.S. government’s discretion to define her relationship 
with her son as fraudulent, as something other than kin. The suspicion of fraud 
potentially redefines the 1993 document registering her son’s birth as either 
trickery (perhaps she obtained an official document by pretending that she had a 
                                                                                                                                       
record, in the name of preserving a measure of anonymity of the tribe with which we are working on 
this project, we decline to provide the title of the report itself as doing so would reveal the tribe’s 
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son) or as falsified (perhaps the document is not official after all, but then, if one 
were to obtain a false document, would not one use a more reasonable registry 
date?). The point is that Amalia does not know how her document will be 
interpreted in the future, but this uncertainty introduces an irresolution in the 
present: between son and not-son, truth and falsehood, fraud and claim, resident 
and alien, and sovereign and non-sovereign nation. To resolve the irresolution, 
Amalia (with the help of her legal service provider) produces more documents: the 
text of a Salvadoran law regarding the reissuance of birth certificates, a certified 
translation of this law, and a word-for-word translation of the birth certificate in 
question. Likewise, the Tribal Nation amasses more genealogical records. Both 
Amalia and the Tribe attempt to push the future, to secure the desirable decision, 
even as in doing so, their documents disappear: the Certificates of Degree of 
Indian Blood somehow fail to establish Indianness, the birth certificate may not 
be proof of filiation, Chae Chan Ping’s reentry certificate is revocable, and 
Kagama’s and Iyouse’s records of tribal affiliations vanish. And in this 
disappearance, the nation as full or complete, as sovereign, appears in all its glory. 
The ruling texts of law—its certificates, records, and case opinions—fill in the 
spaces left by the suspension of law-as-rule in favor of law-as-grace. These spaces 
are occupied by the undocumented and by Indians whose existence troubles the 
trope of “discovery” as justification for the acquisition of Indian land and of 
“sovereignty” for the importation or exclusion of migrant labor. Thus law acts, in 
the moment of its own abeyance, through the far-from-inert records that 
magically authorize its founding.  
 
 
